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1. Preliminary Remarks
The author of this paper, who is expected to outtine the Hungarian 
view, is in a difficult position. The organisers of the conference have, no 
doubt, invited experts from various countries to hear from them many- 
sided and differentiated viewpoints in connection with the role of the neut­
ral countries in preserving European peace and security. Besides Unanti­
cipated views of approval, the organizers would obviously welcome some 
critical remarks as well. But in the recent past, both official and non-official 
Hungarian public opinion have developed such a positive picture of the 
activities of the neutral countries and voiced practically such non-critica! 
views that the following paper might perhaps look one-sided and biased; 
it. however, — I think — reflects the truth.
It is an interesting feature of the neutrality issue, at least for an inter­
national lawyer, that neither official nor nonofficial Hungarian public 
opinion distinguishes among the four countries as to whether they are leg- 
allv bound to maintain their neutrality or not. The last time the legal as­
pects of neutrality were discussed was when Austria wanted to regulate 
its relations with EEC. It then became obvious that the specific obligations 
of neutrality can be interpreted so differently that their contents cannot 
be defined precisely. However, since these problems are not relevant any 
more, the legal aspects have no bearing on the subject any more. This, of 
course, does not mean that this problem may not surface again in case 
of some concrete issues in the future. Legal problems come up mostly when 
political conflicts arise among States. But since there is no such conflict at 
this moment between Hungary and any of the neutral countries in Europe, 
nobody is going to raise the legal aspects of neutrality. It can further be 
observed that the four countries are not conducting their neutral policies 
because they are under a legal obligation to do so but because such a policy 
appears to be in their basic internal or external political interest.
*'] )i¡s paper was presented a the teonfercnce an „The Hole of the European Neutrals" 
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Although neutrality is originally a military conception, the military 
aspects of this status are not emphasized in recent discussions in Hungary eit­
her. Naturally, we consider it highly favorable that no NATO troops are 
stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Hungarian frontiers; and we 
know, of course, that Austria's Western neighbours also appreciate the fact 
that Warsaw Pact units are at a proper distance from them. Apart from 
this, military aspects have long been overshadowed by purely foreign poli­
tical economic or cultural considerations, which is a clear sign of the fact 
that the beneficial effects of rfe/cM/e still exist.
What really matters now to the Hungarians, is that at the other side 
of the border between East and West there are some countries which — 
although unambiguously belonging to the West — consistently pursue a 
policy of national interest and not a policy furthering bloc interests, i.e. the 
interests of other States which are for example outside Europe, have much 
a large population and incomparably larger military and economic capabili­
ties. Such a policy could probably be considered a sign of a healthv plural­
ism in international relations and undoubtedly contributes to the democ­
ratization of these relations. It is extremely important for us that we should 
not face a rigid, hostile bloc of capitalist countries. This fact makes it certa­
inly easier to pursue our national interests, too, both in foreign and inter­
nal policies.
Apart from the above-mentioned considerations, the views of official 
or non-official public opinion in Hungary on the four European neutral 
States are determined mostly by bilateral factors. People are not inclined 
to generalize about the policies of the nentral countries as such; they prefer 
to draw conclusions from what now these countries act in their bilateral re­
lations with Hungary, from the level of cooperation they are ready to deve­
lop with us. As will bo seen from this paper, this level is different from coun­
try to country.
2. Public Opinion
Non-official public opinion reganding the neutral States has always 
been highly positive. It is Austria that tops the list in this regard. The rea­
sons can easily be understood. Due to geographic proximity and the com­
mon historic past, Hungarians have always had ample opportunity to get 
acquainted w ith the Austrian people and with the foreign policy of that 
country. Strangely enough, in the region East to the River Lajta, the past 
is evoking mostly positive memories, although schoolchildren, in their 
studies of the history of the 18th and 19th centuries, inevitably learn that 
the Hapsburgs conducted a policy of oppression and that the two most 
important Hungarian independence movements fought against the Haps­
burgs (1703 — 1711, 1848 — 1849). But as regards the grown-up population 
the neighboring State evokes different memories. And this change is not 
merely due to the seven decades that have passed between the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the present day but it is also due 
to a new approach developed by the Hungarian economic historians in the 
last fifteen years.
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In their studies of the Monarchy, these historians have pointed out 
that, in spite of political subordination, being part of the Monarchy had 
been less unfavorable for Hungary than earlier judgments had concluded. 
This was particularly true of the period between the "Compromise" C 'd  M.s- 
in 1867 and World War 1. In the course of this period, there emer­
ged possibilities for the development of a comparatively significant Hunga­
rian processing industry. The Hungarian industrial products could find 
their market within the Monarchy, on a comparatively large territory. In 
addition, the same currency was used in all parts of the Monarchy. Conse­
quently, the Hungarian economy never struggled with currency problems 
(in contrast to certain periods following Hungarian independence).
Tourism of the early 1960s also had a favorable impact on public opi­
nion. In this period it first became possible for considerable numbers of 
Hungarians to travel to the West. Naturally, their first stopover was Aust­
ria. Breaking with the severe isolationst policies of the 1950s, the Hungarian 
government, having the necessary means at its disposal, supported this 
tourism. Since the Hungarians were cordially welcomed in Austria, this 
country received favorable ratings in Hungarian public opinion. The fact 
that the Austrian living standard was comparatively high also played a 
role. Thus Hungarian tourists travelling to Austria got acquainted with 
a friendly, stable State, whose economy was in good shape.
It must also be borne in mind that up to the recent past it was the Ger­
man language that was most widely spoken in Hungary — of course also 
due to Hungary's belonging to the Monarchy. Consequently, there were no 
serious linguistic obstacles to communication between the two nations.
A  further essential factor is the advantageous image Austria enjoys 
in the Hungarian mass media. After getting beyond the conflicts of 
the years following 1956, there were practically no critical reports by the 
Hungarian press and radio on Austria. The Hungarian press is refrain­
ing from comments or critical remarks even in the case of unfavorable 
phenomena in Austria and is publishing only matter-of-fact information.
The neutral and independent policy Austria, of course, also contribu­
ted to the development of a positive attitude. This policy was personified 
during the last years in Chancellor Burno Krciskv who enloyed enormous 
popularity here. It became customary in Hungary to speak about the 
,,K.u.K." (Krciskv und Kádár) relationship.
As far as Finland is concerned, impressions in Hungarian public opi­
nion are likewise favorable. Although, due to geographical distance and 
language reasons, relations with the Finnish people cannot be compared 
with those with the Austtians. Hungarians nevertheless cherish the kinship 
with the Finish nation very vividly. Another important fact is the very 
warm welcome which Hungarian tourists have received in Finland. There 
emerged the feeling that Hungarian tourists were liked in Finland just be­
cause they were Hungarians. It would be difficult to find objective reasons 
behind this mutual affection. However, the foreign policy pursued by Fin­
land since the Second World W ar has undoubtedly played an important 
role in this respect, too.
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Prohahlv Switzerland is in third ptaccofthe"pupu)aritv list".The favn- 
rattle stereotype the Swiss enjoy in the world is also shared hv Hungarians, 
who respect the Swiss as reliable, precise and diligent- people. These are 
qualities which can earn a very high prestige Tor a people. This favorable 
image, however, is somewhat tarnished by the fact that, although foreign­
ers visiting Switzerland are given a friendly welcome, it lacks the cordia­
lity which other peoples show. Another shadow which falls on this favorable 
image is due to the fact that Hungarians have learned about the difficu! 
ties foreigners living in Switzerland have to cope with.
To Hungarian public opinion, Switzerland's internal policies arc enti- 
relv unknown. Shouldapublic opinion poll be taken today. Hungarians, in 
all probability, fail to be able to name a single Swiss politician. Hungarians 
however, regard Swiss neutrality with respect.
Sweden's image is similarly favorable. The high level of (social) secu­
rity in that country is well known in Hungary. Opinions on social-democra­
tic domestic policies — in spite of the fact that they are often accompanied 
with high taxes — are highly positive. Social democracy is among the con­
cepts which enjoy the best resonance in Hungary. Besides Bruno Kreiskv 
and W illy Brandt, Olof Palme, too. enjoys considerable popularity in 
Hungary.
Naturally, the positive opinions outlined above are not primarily 
or solely the result of the neutral polit ies pursued by the countries concer­
ned. but, as I have already briefly indicated, other circumstances also play 
a role. The fact, however, that Hungarian mass media continuously present 
a highly favourable picture of these countries, is obviously related to the 
neutral policies they pursue. It is likewise due to their neutral policies that 
the public statements of the political leaders of the four countries do 
not contain any disapproval, at least in the last decade and a half, of Hun­
gary.
It is an interesting feature of the over all picture that has developed 
in Hungarian public opinion that ideological differences, namely the fact 
that all four countries have another type of social system, does not play an 
essential role in this regard. Even those parts of public opinion which dec­
lare themselves the most active adherents of socialism accept the above- 
mentioned countries with their different socio-political systems. Even 
they do not feel that those differences can essentially influence the develop­
ment of relations between peoples. An eventual reassessment of other non­
neutral nations in Hungary would, in a!) probability, rank them without 
much attention to the fact that they belong to another social system. That 
international antagonisms and the relatoins between groups of countries be­
longing to two different social systems influence the subconscious attitude, 
is of course a different matter. Similarly. Western views on Hungary (or 
socialism) do not remain indifferent to such differences either.
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3. Bilateral Relations
in the following analysis, factors ttiat are not directly re!ated to the 
])olicy of neutrality will again be discussed. On the other hand. neutrality 
is one ofthe determining factors in the dcvelo{)tnent of bilateral relations as 
well. To the best of my knowledge. however, in these relations, especially 
in intergovernmental di[)lo)natic negotiations, little mention is made of 
neutrality itself. In most eases, contacts ate established to tackle more 
concrete problems.
a j Austria
Our bilateral relations with Austria have become intensive and bene­
ficial to both sides in the period following the ,.Second Compromise" 
("Zweiter Ausgleich"), after several years of international political tensions 
that followed the events of 1936 in Hungary came to an end. The Austrian 
Coreign Minister Bruno Kreisky first visited Hungary in 1964. In 1965. 
this visit was returned by his Hungarian counterpart, dános Péter. The 
first meetings between Heads of State took place in 1967— 1969. However, 
as Federal Chancellor, Kreisky visited Hungary only as late as 1973. An­
other three years had to elapse until dános Kádár received and accepted an 
Austrian invitation. Since then, however, meetings between the Heads 
of State, Heads of Government, and /or on the ministerial level have beco­
me more frequent and regular, in 1977. President Kirchschläger visited 
Budapest, while in 1979 Hungarian Head of State Pál Losoncxi traveled 
to Vienna. We consider it very important that we recently had the opport­
unity to receive the new Austrian Chancellor, Fred Sinowatx, who ¡arid his 
first foreign visit after he had succeeded Brutto Kreisky to Hungary. All 
these visits helped to intensify Austro-Hungarian relations. In Hungary, 
there is a very strong conviction that this process will continue in the years 
to come.
The same favorable assessment applies to the legally regulated relati­
ons as well. Among the bilateral treaties, the most important agreement 
concerns the abolition of the obligatory visasystem. Other important trea­
ties include consular, extradition, criminal-legal assistance, and cultural- 
scientific agreements, as well as an agreement on the equivalence of school 
certificates.
The present economic relations between the two countries are charac­
terized by intensive trade. Our trade turnover with Austria is comparati­
vely high. It is more than twice the turnover with the i'nited States and 
one third of the turnover with the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
means an average 600 miliőn dollars of total turnover; however, the Hunga­
rian import share unfortunately only 66 to 80 per cent of this. It is for this 
reason that a free trade agreement with Austria would be important to 
Hungary. In 1976 it seemed that Austria was ready to sign such an agree­
ment with Hungary. Prime Minister György Lázár proposed to Bruno 
Kreisky to conclude a free trade agreement that year, 'flic answer given 
by the Austrian Chancellor was that his government "would give favorable
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consideration to the proposal". This was also included in the joint commu­
niqué issued on the talks between the two sides. In December 1976, howe­
ver, during János Kádár's visit to Vienna, it became obvious that Austria 
was not willing to conclude an agreement along these lines, mainly because 
of alleged West German objections. This was all the more significant because 
Austria, as a member of EFTA  and as a result of her free trade agree­
ments with the European Communities, had become part of a big economic 
unit. Exports to this unit are causing increasingly serious problems for 
Hungarian foreign trade. It must be added here that Austrian tariff rates 
are higher than the rates of the West European countries or those of EEC. 
Trade with Austria is also somewhat hindered by the so-called countersign­
ing ("Vidierungsvermerk") procedure which was introduced allegedly as 
a protection against dumping prices. Although this procedure is a formal 
one, it undoubtedly belongs to non-traiff trade barriers. Moreover, in some 
individual cases Austrian authorities are granting traiff concessions to 
Hungarian exporters.
In spite of these problems, the Hungarian appraisal of Austrian fore­
ign trade policy is positive. Our Austrian partners belong to the most reliab­
le and honest trade partners. Therefore, all our endeavors are aimed at ex­
tending economic relations. Nobody in Hungary now has reservations about 
Austria's above-metioned free trade agreements with the European Com­
munities. It wits only in the early 1960s that a certain anxiety arose. At 
the time, there were speculations about the institutionalization of Austria's 
relations with West-European integration. The question of the interpreta­
tion of Austria's neutrality was raised. More specifically, the issue of whether 
tliis neutrality should go beyond the military sphere or not was discus­
sed. It was the general conviction in Hungary that already in peace-time 
a permanently neutral State must follow a political line which guarantees 
that in case of armed conflict it can preserve its neutrality. In Hungary at 
that time opinion was held that Austria's association with EEC was in­
compatible with her neutrality.
Although association does not yet mean "joining" EEC, and though 
formally it would not infringe Austria's on neutrality, factually, however, 
it would. As part of EEC's customs union, the Austrian national market 
would practically be united with the market of the European Community. 
This in turn would result in further economic integration with the members 
of the Community, first of all with the Federal Republic fo Germany. The 
over 50% share of Austrian foreing trade with EEC would in all probability 
increase further to the disadvantage of the East-European countries. The 
dependence of the Austrian economy would considerably increase the in­
fluence of the governing bodies of the Community. At that time some even 
raised the issue of the voilation of the so-called "Æ?.scMwss ¿xm" of the 
Austrian State Treaty (Art. 4.), which, however, was an obvious exaggera­
tion.
Later, it was learned in Hungary with dissatisfaction that, since the 
mid-1960s, intensive negotiations had been held between representatives 
of EEC and the Austrian government. According to our information, by
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the time of the Italian veto on June 30,1967, those negotiations had come 
to a stage where preliminary agreement had been reached on Austria's 
admission to the Common Market's customs union. This meant that Aust­
ria was ready to adopt EEC's external customs rates. What is more, unter 
this agreement, she was to adjust her agricultural policy to that of the 
Common Market.
Naturally, all these events already belong to the past; I  mention them 
only for the sake of historical truth. The change in the Hungarian attitude 
towards the free trade agreement since that time is partly due to a highly 
favourable change in Austria's foreign policy towards Hungary. But it is 
also a result of a considerable modification of the Hungarian approach 
to West-European integration itself. At the end of the fifties and during the 
following, years, the European Communities had been branded by the 
Hungarian press and also in some official statements, simply as the Euro­
pean economic base of NATO. Later, however, Hungary accepted the 
existence of the Common Market as a "reality" and — especially in the 
framework of the CMEA — has even shown readiness to enter into insti­
tutionalized relations with the European Community. It became obvious 
that the Community did not pose such a political danger to the develop­
ment of East-West relations as it had earlier been assumed.
Hungarian politicians and diplomats who are in personal contact with 
their Austrian counterparts have a favorable impression of them. According 
to their opinion, Austrian politicians serve the national interest of their co­
untry in such a Avay that they are paying considerable attention to the 
interests of other European countries as íveli, in spite of the fact that some 
of them, Hungary for instance, belong to a different social system. A  recur­
rent adjective in Hungarian statements about the relations between the 
two countries is "exemplary". This means that Austro-Hungarian relations 
might be a model for the relations between all countries which have diffe­
rent political systems. It is especially important to underline this fact 
since, as is widely known, the leaders of the ruling Austrian Socialist Party 
do not share at all the ideology of the Communist Parties. An incident 
characteristic of this position occured when, during his 1973 visit, Mr. 
Kreisky refused to see Air. Kádár at the Central Committee headquarters. 
Nor was Mr. Kreisky willing to enter into inter-party relations. Neverthe­
less, the visit was highly sucessful. Subsequently, the Hungarian side also 
respected the SPÖ's standpoint according to which inter-State relations 
are to be distinguished from inter-partv relations. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) was ready to estab­
lish such relations. Its Secretary-General has already been to Hungary some 
time ago; its Chairman Dr. Alois Mock just visited Hungary in January 
1984.
This evolution leads to the conclusion, that Hungary too, accepts the 
viewpoint that permanent neutrality does not mean neutralism and, as a 
consequence, the Austrian government cannot be expected to take a neut­
ral stand on ideological issues. The democratic political system of Austria 
is respected in Hungary as well as is Austria's support for classical Western
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vêtues. Huttgary gladly takes cognizance of the fact at the same time Aust­
ria respects the Hungarian political system ami. in spite rtf the differen­
ces in the political systems of the two countries, is wilting to maintain close 
and friendly relations with Hungary. It is my conviction that both nations 
benefit from this state of affairs in bilateral relations and that it greatlv 
contributes to the preservation of peace ami security and to the improve­
ment of the quality of life in this ¡tart of the continent, which has suffered 
from so many conflicts in the past.
Finland
In the past decades, Hungarian-Finnish relations have also developed 
very positively. Here, too, something similar to the evolution of Austro- 
Hungarian relations occurred after the tensions following the events of 
1956 had ceased to exist. In 1963, \!r. 1 rho Kekkonen first visited Hun­
gary. In 1969. the Finnish President visited Hungary again. Although Janos 
Kádár first visited Finland only as late as 1973. thisWas not a negative 
sign, since Hungarian-Finnish relations had been developing well as the 
second half of the 196<)s. It is not necessary here to list all the highly inten­
sive contacts between the two States in the past decades. It is sufficient to 
recall that shortly after his election. President Koivisto visited Hungarv 
as early as 1982, and János Kádár returned his visit already in 1983. The 
Hungarian press commented on this latter visit in superlatives and un­
derlined the various manifestations of persona] sympathy which developed 
between the two statesmen.
Finland is the other W'est-European country that was wiliing to sign 
an agreement with Hungary on the abolition of obligatory visas (Hungarv 
submitted similar proposals to several other \\ estem countries, including 
neutral and non-aligned countries, but failed to get a positive response). 
The ten-year economicindustrial and technical-scientific agreements 
signed in 1974 are significant, as well as a treaty abolishing trade ob­
stacles. which is ]¡tactically a free trade agrément. In 1978. a bilateral 
treaty on abolishing dual taxation and in 1981. an agreement on criminal 
police matters were concluded.
1'nfortunately, owing to geographical distance and to the characteris­
tics of the industrial structure of the two countries, economic relations 
between Hungary and [ inland are less intensive that) political relations. 
Hungarian foreign trade with Finland reaches only one fifth of the volume 
with Austria, despite the fact that there are no administrative obstacles 
whatsoever to hinder the development of foreign trade. Nevertheless, 
our foreign trade experts appreciate very much the high level of develop­
ment iti certain processing industrial branches (such as the paper industry) 
and arc trying to increase the volume of Finnish imports.
Also due to geographical distance, atid because of the high Finnish 
price level, each year only about 4000-5000 Hungarian tourists have been 
visiting [ inland in the recent past, f rom Finland, a similary low number 
of tourists. 19,000-20,000. has traveled to Hungary. On the other hand 
att astonishingly high numbemf people arc studying Hungarian in Finland.
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attending (tay-fime and evening university courses. The number of linns 
w)to are visiting tile Hungarian Cultural amt Scientific Center, founded 
in 1980 in Hetsinki. is simitartv higti.
Like the retations estatitishcd with their Austrian partners, rotations 
tie tween Hungarian and Finnish potiticians ami dijiloinats on different 
tevets are trutv exemptary. in Hungary, the opinion is hetd that these par- 
ticutartv fortunate retations tietween countries tietonging to two distant 
regions of Europe have a positive effect on the overatt security of Europe 
as wet). It is otherwise of speciat importance for us that the potiticat steps 
taken tiv the Hungarian government continuoustv meet with positive 
reactions from both Austria ami Finland. it is evident that reactions 
in the neighborhood are atwavs an essentia) factor for the devetopment of 
the potiticat strategy of a given country. Such favorable reactions are 
strengthening those tendencies in Hungary that have been taking shape 
in the course of more than a quarter of a century since 1930.
rj Switzerland
That Hungarian-Swiss retations are good, hut not distinctly intensive, 
is due to Switzertand's special potiticat system, tier sophisticated iederat 
structure. The interruption of retations in the period fottowing 1936 tasted 
much tonger than in the case of Austria or Finland. ( Inly in the 1970s the 
Swiss government agreed to a ruppwcAcwea/ with Hungary, in 1978, Swiss 
Foreign Minister Pierre Auhert visited Hungary and the Swiss Finance 
Minister also came to Budapest. Two years later, then Foreign Minister 
Frigyes Puja returned the visit of his Swiss counterpart, and the Hunga­
rian Ministers of Foreign Trade and of Finance atso visited Switzerland.
In 1973. Hungary signed an economic agreement with Switzertaml 
which, among other things, provided for the establishment of mixed commi- 
tees. The existence of these committees contributed to the significant 
devetopment of our economic retations — they are considerabty more inten­
sive than the potiticat retations. In recent years, our foreign trade turnover 
with Switzertand has been the same that with the United Staates. The 
products of Swiss industry, hightv devetoped in certain fietds, are much in 
demand in Hungary. At present some 109 cooperation agreements between 
Hungarian and Swiss companies are in force; in this regard, Swiss industry 
is in second ptace, fottowing the Fcdera! Republic of Oermany. 1 nfortuna- 
tetv, Hungarv did not succeed in reaching a balance in her economic reta­
tions with Switzertand either. Hungarian exports cover ontv 60 — 70% of 
the annua] imports from Switzertand.
Due to the Swiss federal system, there is no iutor-State cuttural agree­
ment tietween the two countries. However, agreements were concluded 
instead tietween the Swiss amt the Hungarian Academics of Sciences and 
atso between the Hungarian Cuttural institution and its Swiss counterpart, 
although ontv as tate as 1980.
t am convinced that the potiticat retations have reached the existing 
tevet ontv because the Swiss government does not maintain particutartv ac­
tive retations with the rest of the world in genera). Swiss forcing policy
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does not aim at spectacular international initiatives. On the other hand, 
we hope that Hungarian-Swiss relations on different levels which were 
established in the past will continue for the benefit of both countries.
Sweden
Swedish-Hungarian contacts were the last to develop. The first (and 
only) high-level meeting took place only four years ago, when Deputy Pre­
mier Jozsef Marjai visited Stockholm. There are now plans for Olof Palme 
to visit Hungary in 1984. In addition, however, in recent years several Hun­
garian government members have visited Sweden and rice reraa. That con­
tacts are not particularly intensive reflects the fact that there are no open 
questions to solve in Swedish-Hungarian relations. Meetings between the 
two sides up to now have been highly sucessful. We are therefore entitled 
to hope that relations will further develop in the future.
In the economic field, the long-term trade agreement, signed in 1982, 
can be considered significant. Furthermore, mention is to be made of the 
agreement (signed also in 1982) which abolished double taxation, and of a 
legal assistance agreement signed in September 1983. The trade agreement 
removed several commercial obstacles between the two countries. However, 
the maintenance by Sweden of the import permit system against count­
ries with a State monopoly in the field of trade stilt makes the economic 
relations somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, as in the case of Finanld, geog­
raphical distance is the main reason why the volume of trade is not parti­
cularly high -  the turnover between Hungary and Sweden is about the 
same as between Hungary and Finland.
As regards cultural relations, an agreement was concluded compara­
tively early. In 1969, an agreement was concluded between the Hungarian 
Institute of Cultural Relations and the Swedish Cultural Institute. In 
1972, this was followed by a cooperation agreement between the Acade­
mies of Sciences of the two countries.
The relatively low level of tourism between the two countries is also 
related to geographical distance and to the high Swedish price level. In 
the past few years, some 6,000-7,000 Hungarian tourists visited Sweden, 
while the number of Swedish tourists to Hungary was between 30,000- 
32,000.
It must be remarked here that the Swedish system of granting visas 
is still lagging behind the Hungarian procedure (entry visas to Hungary are 
issued within 24 hours at our Embassies, while at border crossing points 
or at the airport entry visas can be obtained immediately). We would also 
welcome a bilateral consular agreement with Sweden.
4. Multilateral Relations
The role which the four neutral States are playing in securing peace 
and security in Europe, is given a highly favorable appraisal in Hungary. 
All the efforts made by these States to this end, especially in the last 
decade, have been greeted with great satisfaction in Hungary.
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It is hardly necessary to enumerate all the well-known initiatives 
taken by the neutral coutries to further promote Suffice it to say
that we consider the steps taken by the neutrals — many times in coopera­
tion with non-aligned States — to be a qualitative change in the post- 
World War II period of European history. In the course of the Geneva 
phase and the CSCE follow-up conference we had already welcomed the 
first signs of the joint activity by those countries. However, it was during 
the Madrid meeting that the neutrals gave events a decisive impetus. It  
is a general conviction in Hungary that without the activities of the neut­
ral and non-aligned countries, the Madrid meeting would have been a total 
failure. Four years ago, at the start of the talks, for well-known reasons, 
antagonism between East and West had been so severe that in Hungary 
many people lost their hope for a successful conclusion of the meeting. 
The first draft of a final document by the neutral and non-aligned States 
was an enormous help to the common cause.
As is known, however, conflicts were not settled at that time, and a 
new text had to be drafted. According to our view, this latter draft gave 
another impetus to the deadlocked conference. Though the drafts were of 
a compromise nature, we still thought that they would serve the interest 
of the international community. The members of the "n +  n" groups draf­
ted proposals not only on the basis of the lowest common denominator. 
Consequently, the final document of the Madrid meeting does not report 
only that the talks had eventually been concluded. The contents of this 
document provide a useful contribution to the development of European 
inter-State relations.
The members of the Hungarian delegation said that the representati­
ves of the neutral States in Madrid had shown not only considerable good 
will and friendliness but very high professional competence too. In the 
course of the extremely difficult formal and informal nagotiations, these 
representatives proved to be outstanding diplomats. Special appreciation 
was expressed for the heads of the Austrian and Swiss delegations, Mr. 
Ceska and Mr. Brunner.
It was observed by the participants of the Madrid conference that the 
neutral countries — which happened to belong to the smaller States of 
Europe — were looking for ways and means to take part in shaping the 
European political processes. Sinces Hungary does not belong to the bigger 
nations of Europe either, it followed these efforts with special satisfaction. 
According to our view, the participation of the neutral countries is not 
only significant from the point of view of their mediation activities, but 
also because they are making an important contribution to the democra­
tization of international relations, it is clear that certain issues, such as the 
problems of strategic nuclear arms limitation, can only be solved by nego­
tiations between the Great Powers. However, in practicallyall other fields, 
every State in Europe should participate in the solution of problems of 
common interest. Consequently, those institutional forms in which the 
smaller countries can express and represent their interests are highly
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ini]'ortant, es])ecially because these countries h:)ve ]«')itiea] and cultural 
traditions of their own and represent significant human values.
The recent changes in world politics gave rise to grave concern in 
Hungary, since she is keenly interested in maintaining dc/ea/e. There is no 
room here for a deeper analysis of the causes that led to these changes. Hut 
it became clear that political processes within the United States had taken 
a turn unfavorable for us at the end of the 1970s. The trend of the develop­
ment of these processes has been, however, influenced by the behaviour 
of ther States. In this regard. 1 think the role the neutral countries have 
been playing in recent years must not lie underestimated. Their foreign po­
licy has probably demonstrated to the Carter and Reagan Administrations 
that not only the Hast European countries were interested in r/e/cM/f, but 
also the smaller States it) the West.
Naturally, the foreign policy of the neutral countries was not solely 
intended to influence the policy of a Western power. In many cases this 
foreign policy has affected the Socialist countries as wet). Sitae the time 
we intensified our relations with the neutral countries, either in the course 
of the Madrid meeting or on the bilateral level, we too, see a lot of things 
differently in this regard. Eortts.it is similarly important to clearly recog­
nize the interests of the neutral countries to understand how they would 
like Europe to be. and what concrete politicaHinethey consider expedient 
on our part.
In addition to joint actions, we could witness, several times, beneiical 
individual steps by neutral countries as well. Some initiatives by one ol 
the four States have 'net with very positive reactions in Budapest. We 
considered highly positive, for instance, the Kekkoncn proposals regard­
ing creation of a Nordic nuclear free zone, Bruno Kreiskv's idea of linking 
European energy systems, Palme's suggestions to create a nuclear free zone 
in the border areas of the two military alliances in Europe etc. It is not 
forgotten here that Vienna hosts the M BER talks (interrupted in 1983) and 
several other meetings, and that the Austrian capital is going to host the 
next CSCE follow-)))) conference. Nor is it forgotten here that Finland pro­
vided facilities for the first and third phase of CSCE it) 1973 and 1975. 
that Sweden is offering Stockholm as venue for the CSCE Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament, nor that 
Switzerland — partly as one of the European centers of the United Na­
tions — is the permanent host to various multilateral and bilateral ne­
gotiations. These host functions are obviously not limited to providing 
technical facilities; in addition, the diplomacy of the above-mentioned host 
countries has take)) a)) active part in the preparation and organization of 
the meetings.
< )ther positive manifestations of the foreign policy of the neutral count 
ries are also well known. It ¡nay be recalled here, for instance, that Swede)) 
sharply condemned the I 'S role in the Vietnam war and provided exile for 
I S deserters and that the Sweden had been the first Western country to 
support the new united Vietnam. Mr. Kreiskv's efforts to help ease tensions 
it) the Middle East are also positively evaluated by us.
2 ) t  t A s x u lv A t .K )
There can of course be small differences iu the foreign policies of the 
neutral countries. As neutrality is judged from Budapest, it does not mean 
any uniform foreign policy for all the four countries. In February !!)82, 
for example, Austrian Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr. in his Madrid 
speech, condemend the sanction policy initiated and applied by some 
countries against Poland, while other representatives of the neutral States 
be noted in the interpretations by the neutral countries of the maintenance 
failed to denounce these actions. Another characteristic difference is to 
be noted in the interpretetions by the neutral countries of the maintenance 
of the balance between Hast and West. In his speech at the opening session 
of the Madrid CSCK follow-up meeting, the Swedish delegate, for example, 
sharply criticised both "superpowers", one for its role in Afghanistan, the 
other for its role in the Persian (lu If. At the same time, in his opening state­
ment, the Finnish delegate abstained from concrete criticism of either of 
the (treat Powers.
But whatever the differences are in the style of the foreign policies, 
we are absolutely sure that if continuation of had depended solely
on the neutral States, it could have easily been achieved.
1ПГ XEUTR ALITAT AUS UXKARISCHKR SICHI 
LÂSXLÔYALKI
! Die Ditierenxen xwischen det listeneichischen, schweixerischenjinnischen nnd schwe- 
dischenXeutraiitat.
2 Dieiittentliche Meinung in Ungarn dbet die Xeutraiitat.
3 Die bdateralen Bexiehungen xwischen Dngarn nnd der einxehien nentralen Staaten.
4 Die nndtiiateraien Bexiehnngen der nentralen Staaten.
НЕЙТРАЛИТЕТ С ВЕНГЕРСКОЙ ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ
ЛАСЛО ВАЛКИ
1 Ризницы между австрийским, швейцарским, финнским и шведским нейт­
ралитетом.
2 Общественное мнение в Bern ргш и нейтралитете.
3 Двусторонние связи между Венгрией и отдельными нейтральными государ­
ствами.
4 Многосторонние связи нейтральных государств.
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